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The European Central Bank’s 
supervisory powers: the need for 
enhanced macro-prudential supervision 
By Kern Alexander1 
This chapter discusses recent international regulatory reforms and developments in 
macro-prudential supervision in Europe and analyses whether the supervisory 
competences and the institutional design of the European Central Bank and the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism are adequate for the ECB to carry out its prudential 
supervisory powers and whether these powers are adequate for the ECB to be an 
effective macro-prudential bank supervisor. In doing so, it discusses recent 
international regulatory reforms and institutional reforms in macro-prudential 
supervision in Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Although the SSM Regulation2 has been praised as part of necessary regulatory 
reforms to restore euro area banking stability, it raises important legal and 
institutional issues regarding the extent and scope of the ECB’s competence to 
supervise banks and financial groups under the EU Treaties and, alternatively, 
whether or not its powers and capabilities are adequate to achieve prudential 
regulatory objectives. This chapter analyses the European Central Bank’s legal 
competences to regulate credit institutions under the SSM Regulation and whether 
its institutional design is adequate to carry out its supervisory tasks and to protect the 
European financial system against systemic risks. For instance, the SSM only 
provides the ECB with supervisory competence for individual banking institutions and 
banking groups defined as such by the Capital Requirements Directive IV.3 It does 
not authorise the ECB to engage in broader supervision of the financial system, 
including, among other things, the shadow banking industry, the wholesale 
structured securities markets and the OTC derivatives markets and derivatives 
clearing houses. In other words, the EU Treaties provide the ECB with a limited 
competence to act as a micro-prudential supervisor, and not as a macro-prudential 
supervisor with responsibility for oversight of other financial institutions and the 
broader financial system. 
The second area of concern is that the SSM Regulation’s strict separation between 
the ECB’s monetary policy function and the SSM’s supervisory function may inhibit 
and limit the ECB in achieving its price stability mandate because it is precluded from 
                                                                    
1  Professor of Banking Regulation, University of Zurich. 
2  SSM Regulation: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks 
on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). 
3  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 
27.6.2013, p. 338). 
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having access to adequate supervisory information about individual banks that would 
allow it to understand more fully how its monetary policy measures are affecting 
bank lending and overall credit intermediation and associated risks. Conversely, the 
ECB Supervisory Board does not have access to adequate data and related 
information held by the ECB regarding its monetary policy operations. In other 
words, the ECB’s narrow competence under the SSM Regulation to be a supervisor 
of individual credit institutions and banking groups, while only possessing limited 
macro-prudential tools, prevents it from fully carrying out macro-prudential 
supervision and from coordinating its supervisory activities with its monetary policy 
operations. The chapter argues that based on the above the ECB suffers from legal 
and institutional limitations that inhibit its ability to be an effective bank supervisor 
under the SSM framework. 
1 International regulatory context of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism 
Before considering the effectiveness of the ECB as a bank supervisor, it is necessary 
to place the analysis in the context of the international regulatory reforms that have 
occurred since 2009 that are designed to restructure financial regulation to address 
both micro-prudential risks at the level of the institution and macro-prudential risks 
across the financial system. A major weakness in financial regulation prior to the 
2007-2009 crisis was that banking supervision and regulation was disproportionately 
focused on bank balance sheets and less concerned with systemic risks across the 
broader financial system. There was a conventional view that the shifting of risks 
through off balance sheet entities through the use of credit default swaps and 
securitisation structures reduced banking sector instability because other market 
participants (i.e. long-term institutional investors) were willing to invest in bank credit 
and absorb the related risks. The spreading of risk throughout the wholesale debt 
markets was viewed to be beneficial for financial stability and thought to lead to a 
more resilient financial system.4 
The micro-prudential focus on institutions, however, failed to take account of the 
systemic risks in the structured finance and derivatives markets. The lack of a 
macro-prudential focus in banking supervision and regulation resulted in massive 
amounts of leverage building up across the financial system and an over-reliance by 
banks on short-term wholesale funding.5 Moreover, central bankers failed to 
understand the linkages between monetary policy and prudential financial regulation 
and in particular how accommodative interest rate policies can cause asset price 
bubbles and excessive debt in the financial system. The prevailing approach to 
prudential regulation was essentially micro-prudential, that is, it was concerned 
mainly with the stability of individual financial institutions and the response of 
individual banks to exogenous risks, while ignoring the correlation of risks across 
                                                                    
4  See Alexander, Eatwell, Persaud and Reoch (2007), pp. 5-7, and Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, 
Persaud and Shin (2009), p. 18. 
5  Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud and Shin (2009), pp. 26-27. 
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asset classes and counterparty credit and liquidity risks in wholesale securities and 
derivatives markets.6 Indeed, the crisis has led to regulatory reforms that aim not 
only to identify and control risks at the level of individual institutions, but also across 
the financial system. This means that the concept of prudential regulation has 
expanded beyond the regulation and supervision of individual credit institutions to 
include a broader supervisory mandate to monitor and control system-wide risks in 
the securitisation and structured finance markets, maturity transformation risks in the 
shadow banking markets, and the risks associated with centralised trading and 
clearing of OTC derivatives and oversight of securities settlement systems. 
The Financial Stability Board7 and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
have taken the lead in adopting international regulatory standards to address 
macro-prudential risks. Since the financial crisis both international bodies have 
cooperated in developing proposals for macro-prudential reforms by encouraging 
countries to assess the risks outside the banking sector that can threaten banking 
and financial stability. In particular, the FSB has analysed the shadow banking 
market involving non-bank financial firms engaged in maturity transformation – 
borrowing short and lending long – and the systemic risks that this may pose to the 
financial system. The FSB has also adopted principles that states are encouraged to 
follow for the orderly resolution of large systemically important financial institutions. 
The FSB’s principles and objectives are designed to broaden the scope of prudential 
supervision to include systemic risks that can arise from excessive lending in the 
shadow banking industry as well as the risks in the trading, clearing and settlement 
of securities and derivatives. 
Moreover, the macro-prudential standards adopted by the Financial Stability Board 
and International Organization of Securities Commissions provide that regulators 
and supervisors should be monitoring risk exposures across the financial system 
with particular focus on the transfer of credit risk to off-balance sheet entities and the 
trading book risks related to the over-the-counter derivatives market. For example, 
the G20/FSB objective of requiring systemically significant financial instruments (i.e., 
OTC derivatives) to be traded on exchanges and centrally cleared with central 
counterparties (CCPs) or clearing houses is an important regulatory innovation to 
control systemic risk in wholesale securities and derivatives markets, but raises 
important questions about whether or not central clearing of derivatives might lead to 
a concentration of risks in CCPs and clearing houses that creates financial stability 
risks, especially if one of these institutions were to fail. The overriding theme of 
international initiatives (e.g., the G20/Financial Stability Board and IOSCO) has been 
how to devise effective regulatory frameworks that durably link micro-prudential 
supervision with broader macro-prudential systemic concerns of controlling systemic 
risks. 
                                                                    
6  ibid. 
7  The Financial Stability Forum was reconstituted as the Financial Stability Board in 2009 at the G20 
London Summit with a clearer mandate and broader membership. The FSB is a similar 
intergovernmental body set up by the G20 – a group of finance ministers and central bank governors 
from twenty major national economies – to promote financial stability through better coordination on the 
international level as well as more effective regulatory policies. 
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2 Institutional design of macro-prudential supervision  
The move towards macro-prudential regulation will require empowering regulatory 
institutions to have greater powers to monitor and collect data from across the 
financial system and to intervene where deemed necessary by applying supervisory 
measures and tools. Micro-prudential regulation has depended to a great extent on 
the collection and assessment of data from individual institutions and applying 
supervisory measures to the risk-taking of individual institutions. In contrast, macro-
prudential regulation and supervision will necessarily involve the collection and 
analysis of data from across the financial system and applying measures based on 
assessments of risk across the system. Central banks are generally the main 
repositories of macro-economic and financial data. This means that central banks 
will play some type of role in the macro-prudential supervision process – whether 
indirectly by providing data and analysis to the competent supervisory authorities or 
by acting directly as the competent authority themselves. In either case, central 
banks will play a significant role in macro-prudential policy and in monitoring system-
wide risks and by working closely with micro-prudential supervisors to ensure that 
risk-taking at the entity level does not cumulatively undermine financial stability 
across the system. 
In Europe, the institutional restructuring of financial regulation and supervision has 
played a major role in macro-prudential regulatory reforms. The European Union has 
embarked on a major institutional restructuring of financial regulation by creating a 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)8 consisting of three micro-
prudential supervisory authorities – the European Banking Authority, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority and the European Insurance and Occupational and 
Pension Authority – and a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to conduct macro-
prudential oversight of the European financial system.9 The ultimate authority 
however over macro-prudential powers and policies rests with Member State 
authorities but their macro-prudential monitoring and decision-making will be 
coordinated through their membership in the ESRB and other ESFS bodies. 
The European System of Financial Supervision attempts to establish a more 
coherent institutional framework that links the ESRB’s macro-prudential supervision 
and oversight function with the three European Supervisory Authorities’ (ESAs) 
function for coordinating the harmonised implementation of EU financial law and the 
                                                                    
8  The ESFS was adopted based on proposals by the De Larosière Committee in February 2009 in the 
wake of the financial crisis that was aimed at further institutional consolidation of the previous EU 
framework established by the European Council in June 2001 under the Portuguese Presidency and 
which became known as the Lamfalussy framework, named after the Chairman of the Committee of 
Wise Men established by the Commission to promote enhanced supervisory coordination and 
harmonised implementation of EU financial legislation. 
9  Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European 
Systemic Risk Board (OJ L 333, 15.12.2010, p. 1). The ESRB’s became operational on 16 December 
2010. The impetus for the creation of the ESRB was the proposal for a European Systemic Risk 
Committee by the De Larosière Committee in 2009. See generally The de Larosière Group (2009), also 
calling for enhanced capital buffers offered by Basel III, new leverage requirements, greater financial 
transparency, and structural reforms in the banking sector. See Green and Jennings-Mares (2014), 
p. 3. 
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supervisory practices of Member States.10 Indeed, this linkage is essential for 
building an efficient EU supervisory regime that allows Member States to exercise 
more effective oversight of individual firms and investors, whilst monitoring, 
measuring and issuing recommendations and warnings about systemic risk in the 
broader European financial system and across global financial markets. Moreover, 
the ESFS and the three ESAs will ensure that Member State regulatory and 
supervisory authorities can work more effectively together at the micro-prudential 
level to control and manage systemic risk and develop a harmonised regulatory code 
and implementation across all EU states.11 
Regarding macro-prudential oversight, the ESRB’s scientific committee conducts 
research and collects data from Member State central banks. Decision-making is 
vested in the ESRB Board whose members include the central bank governors of EU 
Member States. Bearing in mind the different jurisdictional domains of the EU 
Member States (consisting of Member State authorities and the monitoring function 
of the ESRB) and the euro area (for which the ECB has supervisory jurisdiction), 
responsibility for macro-prudential supervision is thus overlapping and not well 
coordinated between the ECB, national regulatory authorities and central banks12 
and the ESRB – whose powers are limited to issuing recommendations and 
warnings.13 
The ESRB has set out five intermediate objectives that macro-prudential policy 
should aim to achieve. These intermediate objectives are (1) mitigating and 
preventing excessive credit growth and leverage; (2) mitigating and preventing 
excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity; (3) limiting direct and indirect 
exposure concentrations; (4) limiting the systemic impact of misaligned incentives 
with a view to reducing moral hazard; and (5) strengthening the resilience of financial 
infrastructures.14 These five objectives provide the basis for the development of the 
ESRB’s future macro-prudential monitoring function. 
2.1 Redesigning UK regulation 
Following the crisis of 2007-2009, the UK undertook a review of the institutional 
structure of financial regulation and concluded that the former Tripartite model based 
on coordination among the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the 
                                                                    
10  See Alexander, K. (2010). 
11  See Alexander (2011); Alexander (2012a), Appendix 2, 103. 
12  For instance, the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV includes a number of macro-prudential 
instruments, such as counter-cyclical capital buffers, systemic risk, buffers, buffers for global 
systemically important institutions (G-SII) and other systemically important institutions (O-SII). For the 
euro area countries, there is a fair degree of complexity and legal uncertainty about whether the 
European Central Bank or national supervisory authorities will have the final say in deciding whether to 
apply macroprudential instruments. 
13  See Lastra and Goodhart (2015). 
14  Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and 
instruments of macro-prudential policy (ESRB/2013/1) (OJ L 170, 15.06.2013, p. 1). The ESRB 
considers that: ‘identifying intermediate objectives makes macro-prudential policy more operational, 
transparent and accountable and provides an economic basis for the selection of instruments’. Ibid., 
para. 4. 
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Treasury had failed to fulfil their responsibilities of protecting the financial system 
against systemic risks and fulfilling other regulatory objectives.15 The newly-elected 
Government in 2010 proposed draft legislation that ultimately became the Financial 
Services Act 2012, which created the Financial Policy Committee (“FPC”) at the 
Bank of England as the primary macro-prudential regulatory coordinator.16 The 
Financial Services Act 2012 also created a ‘Twin Peaks’ institutional structure for 
micro-prudential regulation consisting of a Prudential Regulation Authority, 
responsible for supervising individual banks, insurance firms, and large investment 
banks, and a Financial Conduct Authority, responsible for investor protection, 
exchanges and market conduct.17 
As macro-prudential supervisor, the FPC is tasked with coordinating and directing 
macro-prudential policy by making recommendations and issuing directives 
regarding the use of macro-prudential measures and instruments and assessing 
macro-prudential conditions in the financial sector.18 The FPC is expected to conduct 
research on macro-prudential risks and to challenge conventional wisdom in micro-
prudential regulatory practices to ensure that generally accepted principles are 
continually tested. For instance, by challenging conventional wisdom, the FPC is 
also expected to challenge the judgments of other supervisors and international 
organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund, which had failed to detect 
and assess the risks that toppled the financial system in 2007 and 2008.19 
2.2 The USA Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
After the financial crisis, the United States recognised that its financial regulation had 
focused too heavily on micro-prudential regulation without an adequate appreciation 
of macro-prudential systemic risks.20 Congress responded by enacting the Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act), the 
preface of which states it is “[a]n Act to promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”21 
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act attempts to set the groundwork for a more 
comprehensive future macro-prudential framework by creating the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC), which brings together top regulators from across the 
government in order to identify and address systemic risk.22 A new Office of Financial 
                                                                    
15  See Financial Services Act, 2012 (UK), section 85. 
16  ibid., para. 4. 
17  ibid. 
18  Both the PRA and FCA are subject to directions and recommendations on a comply-or-explain basis by 
the FPC in regards to macro-prudential measures to the entities or activities they oversee. See 
Financial Services Act, paras. 4 and 6. 
19  For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a report a year before the crisis began in 
2006 claiming that “the dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader… group of investors… helped 
make the… financial system more resilient.” See IMF (2006). 
20  See Block (2012), p. 317. 
21  See Dodd-Frank Act. 
22  ibid, Section 111, 112. 
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Research (OFR) supports FSOC’s mission by collecting data across regulators in 
order to identify potential macro-prudential risks.23 In addition to its general oversight 
and advisory role, FSOC can make recommendations on a “comply or explain” basis 
to other government agencies.24 These institutional reforms are deemed to be crucial 
elements in building a more effective macro-prudential supervisory system. 
Despite many efforts across Europe and globally to reform the institutional design of 
financial regulation, it should be emphasised that policymakers and regulators often 
conflate the need for a conceptual macro-prudential framework with the need for a 
unified macro-prudential supervisory institutional scheme – or, at least, they assume 
that the latter obviates the need for the former.25 It is true that the nature of 
administrative supervision can influence the degree of regulatory consistency and 
completeness.26 Nonetheless, even a unified supervisor will fail if it administers an 
ad hoc set of laws that are not based on a coherent regulatory philosophy and set of 
values that have a consistent focus.27 Similarly, even if a single regulatory authority 
is tasked with overseeing financial stability, macro-prudential regulation can fail if that 
authority lacks a coherent regulatory philosophy and the power to adequately 
implement that regulation. 
Aside from the issue of who should actually exercise macro-prudential regulatory 
and supervisory authority, the macro-prudential supervisory approach involves, 
among other things, the following activities: devising regulatory standards to 
measure and limit leverage levels in the financial system as a whole, requiring 
financial institutions to have enhanced liquidity reserves against short-term 
wholesale funding exposures, and, more generally, counter-cyclical capital regulation 
whereby capital requirements are linked to points in the macro-economic and 
business cycle. Moreover, macro-prudential regulation may also involve linking 
monetary policy (interact rates & money supply), fiscal policy (i.e., government 
taxation & spending), and exchange rate policy (i.e., influencing the value of the 
currency) to the regulation of institutions by monitoring how these policies affect 
prudential supervisory risks across the financial system; this could involve taking 
supervisory measures that support the stability of the financial system as a whole 
and account for the interconnectivity of financial institutions and their effects on the 
global economy in times of crisis. 
                                                                    
23  ibid, Section 153. 
24  ibid, Section 120. 
25  FSB, IMF and BIS (2011), (observing that although countries recognise the need for a system-wide 
perspective, the “main disagreement is on the importance of carving out a specific macroprudential 
[supervisory] framework”). 
26  See FSB, IMF and BIS (2011), p. 4, observing that although countries recognise the need for a 
system-wide perspective, the ‘main disagreement is on the importance of carving out a specific 
macroprudential [supervisory] framework’. Even otherwise ideal macroprudential regulation can be 
misapplied by fragmented supervisory authorities, especially if some of the regulators lack a mandate 
to promote financial stability. 
27  For example, the Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) – the coordinating overseer of financial 
stability in the United States – lacks the power to directly regulate entities or practices. See Financial 
Stability Oversight Council Authority, 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2010) (laying out the structure and powers of 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council). In contrast, the Financial Policy Committee – the United 
Kingdom’s macroprudential regulator – has the power to direct the other financial regulators how to act 
on macroprudential issues. See Walker (2012), 793. See also Financial Services Act. The UK system 
lays out how the regulators will interact with one another, but does not elucidate how the primary 
macroprudential regulator will approach or use macroprudential policies. 
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3 The ECB’s bank supervisory mandate 
The SSM provides the main pillar of the banking union and consists of the ECB and 
the national competent authorities of participating Member States. Its overriding 
objectives are to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system and 
to ensure the unity and integrity of the EU internal market.28 All euro area Member 
States are automatically members, while non-euro area members can decide to 
participate in the SSM through a procedure involving the national competent 
authority entering into a ‘close cooperation’ with the ECB.29 For the other 
non-participating Member States, the ECB is authorised to adopt a memorandum of 
understanding with the relevant national competent authority that explains how the 
ECB will cooperate with the competent authority in performing their respective 
supervisory tasks.30 The ECB will also conclude memoranda of understanding with 
each EU home state competent authority of a systemically important financial 
institution.31  
The ECB is responsible for direct supervision of ‘significant’ credit institutions, which 
represent almost 85% of banking assets in the euro area.32 The ECB will also be 
indirectly responsible for the supervision by national competent authorities of smaller, 
less systemically important institutions.33 The EU General Court has held that the 
determination of the legitimacy of the ECB’s classification of an institution as a 
‘significant entity’ must be assessed in the context of the ECB’s plenary competence 
under the SSM Regulation to supervise credit institutions, and that any challenge by 
a bank on proportionality grounds against such a classification should be assessed, 
among other things, in light of the plenary competence transferred to the ECB 
against the subordinate role attributed to the national competent authorities under 
the Regulation.34 Moreover, it should be emphasised that the ECB only has 
competence to apply its powers to enforce EU prudential banking law and regulatory 
                                                                    
28  SSM Regulation: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks 
on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63), Article 1. 
29  SSM Regulation, Article 7(1) & (2)(a)-(c), providing the legal requirements for ECB cooperation with 
national competent authorities that enter ‘close cooperation’ with the SSM, including rules that apply 
directly to banks established in participating countries. 
30  SSM Regulation, Article 8. 
31  SSM Regulation Article 6(7)(b). 
32  The criteria used to define a bank as significant are: total value of assets, whether it is one of the top 
three largest banks in its home Member State; its importance to the economy of its home state or the 
EU as a whole; and whether it has requested or received direct public financial assistance from the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the European Financial Stability Facility (ESFS). SSM 
Regulation, Article 6(4)(i)-(iii). 
33  SSM Regulation, Article 4(1). 
34  See Judgment of General Court in Case T-122/15, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v ECB, 
T:2017:337, paras. 50-64. 
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requirements against ‘credit institutions’ defined as such under EU law.35 For 
instance, financial institutions that do not accept ‘deposits or other repayable funds 
from the public’ are not defined as ‘credit institutions’ under EU law and therefore are 
not subject to SSM jurisdiction. Similarly, a ‘credit institution’ subject to SSM 
jurisdiction for carrying on activities governed by EU prudential banking law is not 
subject to SSM jurisdiction for activities not subject to EU prudential banking law, 
such as brokering and dealing securities or the marketing and sale of retail financial 
products. For such non-prudential activities, the bank would be subject to other EU 
banking and financial law requirements, such as conduct of business rules, which 
are the sole supervisory responsibility of national competent authorities to monitor 
and enforce.36 
The ECB will act through an executive board – the Supervisory Board37 – that is 
responsible for supervising the euro area’s largest cross-border banks and the top 
three banks by size in each participating Member State.38 The Supervisory Board is 
also responsible for overseeing the supervisory actions of participating national 
competent authorities who directly supervise small and medium sized credit 
institutions in the SSM regime.39 The ECB’s Supervisory Board has ultimate 
discretion to decide whether to intervene and take direct oversight of small and 
medium-sized institutions that are ordinarily subject to direct supervisory control by 
national competent authorities.40 
                                                                    
35  See Capital Requirements Regulation, Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and Council of 
26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms [2-13] OJ L 176/1 
(CRR). CRR, article 4 (1), no 1, defines ‘credit institution’ as ‘an undertaking the business of which is to 
take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account’. See 
generally Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV Package): Directive 2013/36/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and 
repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338) (including the Capital 
Requirements Directive and Capital Requirements Regulation), entered into force 1 January 2014. The 
CRD IV transposes into European law the prudential capital requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms which are based on the internationally-agreed Basel Capital Accord (Basel III 
agreement). 
36  The SSM does not apply to most conduct of business rules that govern a credit institution’s capital 
market activity – such as prospectus requirements, insider dealing and market abuse rules, or 
misselling of retail financial products. These are subject to other areas of EU and national law and are 
supervised by Member State competent authorities (not the ECB). 
37  SSM Regulation, Article 26 (‘planning and execution of the tasks conferred on the ECB shall be fully 
undertaken by an internal body composed of its Chair and Vice Chair’). 
38  The ECB’s bank supervisory powers are exercised through a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
that has an executive board – a Single Supervisory Board (SSB) – that is responsible for supervising 
large cross-border euro area banks and overseeing the supervisory actions of national competent 
authorities responsible for supervising small and medium sized credit institutions in participating 
Member States. The ECB has ultimate discretionary authority to decide whether to intervene and to 
take supervisory decisions that could supersede the decisions of national competent authorities with 
respect to smaller credit institutions which the ECB does not directly supervise. 
39  SSM Regulation, Article 6(7)(a)-(c). See also Article 25(8) (SSB shall adopt ‘draft decisions’ ‘to be 
transmitted... to the national competent authorities of the Member States concerned.’) 
40  SSM Regulation, Article 6(5)(b),’when necessary to ensure consistent application of high supervisory 
standards, the ECB may at any time, or on its own initiative after consulting with national competent 
authorities or upon request by a national competent authority, decide to exercise directly itself all the 
relevant powers for one or more credit institutions’. 
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3.1 ECB’s limited competence as a bank supervisor 
The overarching rationale of the SSM was to sever the tie between banking and 
sovereign debt crises by providing the ECB with supervisory powers over individual 
banking institutions. However, it does not provide the ECB with oversight 
responsibility for non-bank financial firms, shadow banks and off-balance sheet 
entities operating in the financial system. Member State competent authorities retain 
supervisory responsibility for financial institutions and firms not defined as ‘credit 
institutions’ (that take deposits and make credit available to borrowers) under the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV and for oversight of the broader financial system. 
Generally, the ECB does not have legal competence or institutional responsibility to 
monitor systemic and macro-prudential risks across the financial system, as this is 
the responsibility of the European Systemic Risk Board – as discussed above, a soft 
law body comprising all EU Member State central bank governors and a secretariat 
including technical experts. 
At the height of the euro area sovereign debt and banking crisis of 2012, EU 
policymakers debated whether the ECB should act as a bank supervisor and play a 
role in bank resolution. On the one hand, there was an urgent need to sever the link 
between fragile banking institutions and sovereign debtors by enhancing banking 
supervision to repair the banking sector. A redesigned banking supervision regime 
built on the shoulders of the European Central Bank was considered necessary to 
stem the market panic that was sweeping euro area sovereign debt markets in early 
2012.41 After EU institutions agreed to provide emergency funding support for Spain 
from the European Stability Mechanism in May 2012, the European Council issued 
its decision in June proposing a European Banking Union for euro area and other 
participating Member States that would centralise banking supervision with the ECB 
and concentrate resolution powers and deposit guarantee rules at the EU level.42 In 
respect of banking supervision, this expedited plan of action required activation of 
the enabling clause of Article 127(6) TFEU that provides: 
“The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.” 
On the other hand, policymakers questioned whether existing Treaty provisions 
provided an adequate legal basis for the creation of a banking union. In particular, 
there was concern that the ECB’s potential treaty powers were limited strictly to 
micro-prudential supervision of banking and financial institutions based on a 
unanimous vote of EU states, and therefore the ECB could not play a role in broader 
supervision of financial markets, nor could it play a direct role in a reformed bank 
                                                                    
41  As Spain began to lose access to sovereign debt markets in May 2012, urgent action was considered 
necessary by EU policymakers to restore confidence in financial markets so that fragile euro area 
countries could regain access to debt markets on sustainable terms. See House of Lords (2014), 
p. 8-9. 
42  See supra note 12. 
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resolution regime.43 According to this view, the EU Treaties required amendment 
before the ECB and other EU bodies could be entrusted with broad new financial 
supervisory and resolution powers to stabilise the euro area banking sector. Revising 
the Treaties, however, would require unanimous approval by Member States and 
would take much more time than what was available to stabilise the euro area 
sovereign debt markets in 2012 as the sovereign debt crisis spread to Spain and 
Italian banks were having difficulties funding themselves. As a result, EU 
policymakers decided to utilise Article 127(6) of the Treaty to establish the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (the first pillar of the banking union) while providing a fiscal 
backstop through the European Stability Mechanism for ailing euro area sovereigns 
and banks.44 
Regarding the ECB’s competence to act as a bank supervisor, Article 13(2) TFEU 
provides that EU institutions operate under the doctrine of conferred powers, which 
states that public institutions are constrained by law, in this case by treaty, because 
they are creatures of law.45 EU institutions only have powers granted to them by the 
EU Treaties.46 The rationale behind this is that the exercise of state power in a liberal 
society or market economy should be exceptional and require justification and 
constraint.47 In other words, European institutions have legal competence to exercise 
powers that are specifically conferred. 
Under the Treaty, the ECB expressly does not have conferred powers to exercise 
supervision over credit and other financial institutions unless it is authorised to do so 
based on unanimous consent of all Member States. Therefore the SSM Regulation 
was adopted unanimously by activating the enabling clause of Article 127(6) TFEU 
as a basis for conferring supervisory powers on the ECB for credit and other financial 
institutions. According to the language of Article 127(6), however, the ECB can only 
have supervisory powers conferred on it ‘concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the 
exception of insurance undertakings.’ This means it can only have supervisory 
powers conferred on it for individual credit and financial institutions, not wider powers 
involving bank resolution, nor oversight of financial conglomerates or investment 
firms not defined under EU law as ‘credit or other financial institutions.’ Article 127(6) 
essentially applies to micro-prudential supervision of ‘credit institutions and other 
financial institutions’ and not to supervision of other financial firms or areas of the 
                                                                    
43  Indeed, it seemed unlikely until just before euro area sovereign debt crisis re-erupted in May 2012 that 
the Council (Ecofin) would activate the enabling clause of Article 127(6) TFEU. EU Ministers of Finance 
had rejected formal activation of the clause on a number of previous occasions. See Davies (2006), 
p. 42. 
44  See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty; T/ESM 2012-LT), Article 15. 
See also European Stability Mechanism (ESM), Establishment of the instrument for the direct 
recapitalisation of institutions (Board of Governors Resolution, 8 December 2014). 
45  Case C-133/06, Parliament v Council (Safe Countries of Origin) [2008] ECR I-3189, holding, inter alia, 
‘each institution is to act within the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty.’ para. 44, and ‘it has already 
been held that the rules regarding the manner in which the Community institutions arrive at their 
decisions are laid down in the Treaty and are not at the disposal of the Member States or of the 
Institutions themselves’ para. 54. 
46  Case C-133/06, [2008] ECR I-3189, para 55. Article 13(2) TFEU provides ‘[e]ach institution shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, 
conditions, and objectives set out in them’. 
47  See discussion in Chalmers, Davies and Monti (2011), p. 60. 
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financial markets that are off the balance sheets of credit and financial institutions, 
such as the shadow banking market.48 The restrictive language of Article 127(6) is 
presumably why the SSM Regulation was designed specifically to apply only to 
individual ‘credit institutions’ as defined under EU law and possibly to the larger 
banking groups of which they are a part. 
The limited competence of the ECB to act as a bank supervisor under Article 127(6) 
therefore would preclude it from engaging in any supervisory activities directed at the 
broader financial system, including, for instance, the wholesale debt securities 
markets, securities clearing and settlement systems, or bank resolution and 
restructuring.49 This means that the ECB would not have the competence to oversee 
the shadow banking market, which was a source of systemic risk that caused the 
global banking crisis of 2007-09. Moreover, the ECB would not have the competence 
to put a credit institution (which it had the competence to supervise) into resolution, 
nor could it exercise resolution powers, such as transferring the assets of a 
distressed bank to a private purchaser or to a bridge bank, as it would only have the 
competence to make a determination about whether a bank is failing or likely to fail, 
but this determination would not have any binding effect on the decision of the 
resolution authority (the SRM Single Resolution Board) to take a credit institution into 
resolution. The narrow supervisory competence allocated to the ECB under 
Article 127(6) suggests that the ECB would be acting ultra vires if it took broader 
macro-prudential supervisory measures that go beyond prudential policies that 
concern the supervision of individual credit institutions or mixed financial 
conglomerates largely consisting of credit institutions. The narrowly conferred 
powers on the ECB under Article 127(6) TFEU significantly limit its ability to perform 
effective banking supervision and supports the view that the ECB should not be 
granted banking supervisory powers unless the Treaty is amended to provide it – at 
a minimum – with enlarged powers to monitor the broader financial system (i.e., 
macro-prudential supervisory powers) and to take interventionist measures (i.e., 
prompt corrective action) as part of a bank resolution or restructuring. 
3.2 The ECB and macro-prudential supervision 
As discussed above, international financial regulatory norms now require that bank 
supervisors and regulatory authorities have the competence to exercise macro-
prudential supervisory powers and adopt macro-prudential regulatory rules to 
address systemic risks across the financial system. Notwithstanding, the SSM 
appears to provide inadequate macro-prudential supervisory powers to the ECB. 
This can largely be attributed to the limited legal basis in Article 127(6) TFEU for the 
ECB to have responsibility for the supervisory policies of individual ‘credit institutions 
                                                                    
48  The Financial Stability Board has defined shadow banking as ‘a system of credit intermediation that 
involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system’. See Financial Stability Board, 
(2011), p. 2. See also European Systemic Risk Board (2017), p. 2, defining the ‘broad measure’ of 
shadow banking as ‘comprising total assets of investment funds, including money market mutual funds, 
and other financial institutions, amounting to €40 trillion at the end of 2016’.  
49  See also Allemand (2015), arguing that: ‘that Article [Article 127(6)] is a too narrow basis for the 
creation of an independent body’. 
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and other financial institutions.’ To analyse whether the ECB can engage in 
macro-prudential supervision, it is necessary to try to define what is exactly meant by 
macro-prudential supervision. 
Although the definition of macro-prudential regulation and supervision is intensely 
debated, it consists mainly of four main areas: 1) adjusting the application of 
regulatory rules to institutions according to developments in the broader economy 
(i.e., countercyclical capital requirements);50 2) imposing regulatory controls on 
contractual relationships between market participants (i.e., OTC derivatives 
counter-parties, loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios); 3) monetary policy controls, 
such as interest rates, exchange rate controls, regulating money supply, and capital 
controls; and 4) prudential requirements for financial infrastructure or firms providing 
infrastructure services (i.e., capital requirements for derivative clearing houses).51 A 
growing literature has analysed these different areas of macro-prudential 
regulation.52 
At the institutional level, some macro-prudential supervisory authorities have 
identified specific macro-prudential supervisory levers or tools (i.e. counter-cyclical 
capital requirements and limits on distributions).53 For example, the use of 
counter-cyclical capital requirements can be varied depending on the riskiness of 
assets at points in the economic cycle. Denmark and Switzerland have used 
counter-cyclical capital buffers to dampen credit booms in their respective housing 
markets by imposing higher capital requirements on home mortgage loans as 
opposed to other types of loans. Other macro-prudential measures include liquidity 
tools, that is, where financial institutions can be required to hold liquid assets, i.e. 
assets that can be easily turned into cash.54 
Macro-prudential regulatory measures are wider in scope of coverage and 
application and necessarily involve a broader array of prudential supervisory tools 
that include both ex ante supervisory powers, such as licensing, authorisation and 
compliance with regulatory standards, and ex post crisis management measures, 
such as recovery and resolution plans, deposit insurance and lender of last resort.55 
Indeed, the objectives of macro-prudential regulation – to monitor and control 
systemic risks and related risks across the financial system – will require greater 
regulatory and supervisory intensity that will necessitate increased intervention in the 
                                                                    
50  Experts have observed that countercyclical buffers could be difficult to implement. See Brunnermeier, 
Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009), chapter 4, (discussing design of countercyclical 
regulation). 
51  See FSB, IMF and BIS (2011). 
52  Generally, for a review of the literature, see Alexander (2012b), p. 332. 
53  See Bank of England, Financial Policy Committee (2012). 
54  ibid. Also, leverage ratios could be used to limit the amount of leverage relative to the value of the 
bank’s assets. Forward-looking loss provisions: Financial institutions can be required to set aside 
provisions against potential future losses on their lending. Collateral requirements: Lending could be 
limited by imposing higher collateral restrictions, for example if growth in lending appears to be 
unsustainable. An example is a loan to value requirement, which would limit the size of a loan relative 
to the value of the asset. Similarly, “haircuts” on repurchase agreements would limit the amount of cash 
that can be lent as a proportion of the market value of a set of securities. Information disclosure: 
Greater transparency could help markets work better. For example, in times of crisis, more information 
about different institutions’ risk exposure could increase the flow of credit as uncertainty is reduced. 
55  See The de Larosière Group (2009). See also UK Financial Services Authority (2009). 
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operations of cross-border banking and financial groups and a wider assessment of 
the risks they pose. Under the SSM, does the ECB have the necessary scope of 
authority to be an effective macro-prudential supervisor? 
As discussed above, the SSM Regulation allocates broad competences and powers 
to the ECB/SSB in the field of prudential supervision for individual credit institutions 
and certain investment firms: for instance, monitoring capital adequacy, liquidity 
buffers and leverage limits56 and approving bank recovery plans and asset transfers 
between affiliates within banking groups or mixed financial conglomerates.57 The 
SSM provides however for limited macro-prudential tasks that are set forth in 
Article 5, entitled “Macroprudential tasks and tools”, which include the discretion to 
impose stricter prudential requirements, including higher capital buffers, on individual 
banks based on macro-prudential factors in the country where the bank is based.58 
Although the exercise of these macro-prudential tools rests primarily with the 
NCAs;59 the ECB may intervene and utilise these tools “if deemed necessary”,60 and 
in adopting a particular measure is then required to take the specific circumstances 
of the Member State’s financial and economic situation into account61 as well as 
“duly consider” any objection of a national competent authority that seeks to address 
a macro-prudential risk on its own.62 Moreover, the Capital Requirements 
Regulation63 permits the ECB/SSM to take macro-prudential measures, other than 
increased capital buffers, only in limited circumstances for banks based in a 
participating Member State where the ECB has identified macro-prudential or 
systemic risks.64 
Another macro-prudential concern with the SSM is that it applies only to banking 
institutions that are legally defined as ‘credit institutions’ under EU law – that is, 
banks that perform traditional intermediary functions of taking deposits and providing 
credit through commercial and retail lending.65 The SSM’s regulation of credit 
institutions, however, does not cover the growing number of non-bank financial 
intermediaries and structured entities that are not defined as ‘credit institutions’ under 
EU law. These non-bank financial intermediaries or ‘shadow banks’ are playing an 
                                                                    
56  Article 4(1)-(4) SSM Regulation. 
57  Article 4(1)(k) SSM Regulation. 
58  Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
59  Article 5(1) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
60  Article 5(2) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
61  Article 5(5) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
62  Article 5(4) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
63  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).  
64  Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR): Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1), Article 458. Article 458 
is entitled ‘Macro-prudential or systemic risk identified at the level of a Member State’ and states in 
relevant part: ‘2. Where the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1 identifies changes in 
the intensity of macro-prudential or systemic risk in the financial system with the potential to have 
serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a specific Member 
State and which that authority considers would better be addressed by means of stricter national 
measures, it shall notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the ESRB and EBA of 
that fact and submit relevant quantitative or qualitative evidence’. 
65  See Article 4.1(1) of the Capital Requirements Regulation. 
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increasingly important role in the maturity transformation process – borrowing short 
and lending long – outside the formal banking sector in the European economy, but 
which are not subject to prudential regulatory controls. It is this type of non-bank 
credit intermediation and related trading of credit instruments that, although 
important for the development of the European economy and its capital markets, 
must nevertheless be regulated carefully to address macro-prudential financial risks. 
Presently, the ECB does not have the competence to address these risks. 
Moreover, under the proposal for a Special Resolution Mechanism, the ECB will 
have only limited powers, merely allowing it to cooperate with the SRM’s Single 
Resolution Board (SRB) in conducting an assessment of the extent to which banks 
and groups under its direct supervision are resolvable without the assumption of 
extraordinary public financial support,66 and to notify the SRB of a supervised entity 
requiring resolution.67 In addition, under the Commission’s proposed Regulation to 
implement the Liikanen Committee’s proposals on structural regulation, the ECB will 
have the authority to review the trading activities of banking groups under its 
supervision,68 and to have discretion to initiate the separation of deposit-taking 
banks from the group’s trading entities.69 And the ECB may exempt entities under its 
supervision from the scope of the proposed EU Structural Regulation altogether if it 
deems that they have a sufficiently robust resolution strategy in place.70 
From a macro-prudential perspective, the SSM should help to mitigate systemic risk 
at the level of the individual credit institution. However, the ECB/SSM will only have 
competence to supervise individual banks or ‘credit institutions’ as defined under EU 
law.71 As a result, the ECB/SSM will have only limited authority to impose regulation 
aimed at reducing systemic risk, involving, for example, imposing higher capital and 
liquidity requirements on individual banks. It will not have competence to regulate 
non-bank financial intermediaries – such as shadow banks – nor will it have the 
competence to regulate the off-balance sheet entities involved in the securitisation 
and structured finance markets that are increasingly playing a greater role in 
channelling large volume of credit and leverage to European businesses and 
consumers.72 In other words, the ECB will have very limited authority to address 
macro-prudential systemic risks that can arise in the broader financial system where 
                                                                    
66  Article 8(1) Commission Proposal of 10 July 2013 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions 
and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank 
Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (COM(2013) 520 final). 
67  Article 16(1) Commission Proposal of 10 July 2013 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions 
and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank 
Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (COM(2013) 520 final). 
68  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures 
improving the resilience of EU credit institutions COM/2014/043 final – 2014/0020 (COD) Article 9(1). 
69  Article 10(2). Once the separation initiated, the ECB will review the separation plan submitted by the 
entity and can require its amendment (Article 18). 
70  Article 4(2). 
71  See Article 4.1(1) Capital Requirements Regulation. 
72  Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
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non-bank financial intermediation is growing along with increased trading and 
clearing of risky financial instruments such as credit default swaps. 
Although the ECB has exceptional powers to impose stricter prudential requirements 
and additional capital buffers have been carved out in Article 5,73 the use of these 
tools now rests primarily with the national designated authorities (NDAs); the ECB 
may take over the task “if deemed necessary”,74 and is then required to take the 
specific circumstances of the Member State’s financial and economic situation into 
account75 as well as “duly consider” any objection of an NCA proposing to address 
the local situation on its own.76 
4 Separating ECB monetary policy from banking 
supervision 
The ECB’s role as a bank supervisor might bring it into conflict with its main treaty 
objective of price stability.77 According to this view, the ECB might be tempted to 
lower interest rates or to loosen conditions for bank access to liquidity in order to 
stabilise the banking sector, but this might lead to easier terms of credit thereby 
conflicting with its price stability objective.78 This is why supervisory mandates for 
central banks tend to be controversial. In general, the price stability mandate of 
central banks is obstructed by short-term goals, e.g. avoiding high interest rates and 
unemployment due to electoral and political pressures – hence the need for central 
banks to be independent so that they are immune from these pressures. Accordingly, 
a central bank receiving explicit or implicit employment or economic growth 
mandates will face the same conflict. A supervisory mandate thus potentially results 
in lenient monetary policies to prevent bank illiquidity and insolvency; central banks 
also enjoy easier ‘bureaucratic entrenchment’ than a supervision-only agency would, 
making them less accountable for the moral hazard they create. The optimal 
governance architecture needed for such a double mandate is unclear: lawmakers 
struggle to combine an efficient relationship between the monetary and supervisory 
sides whilst yet ensuring adequate accountability. Other governance issues are both 
external (especially towards national resolution authorities) and internal, such as the 
transparency of central bank policies: while excessive transparency may potentially 
damage the credibility of central banks, e.g. when responding to temporary market 
disturbance, empirical evidence shows that higher transparency in forecasts is 
                                                                    
73  Article 5(1) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
74  Article 5(2) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
75  Article 5(3) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
76  Article 5(4) Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
77  Article 127(6) TFEU provides that ‘price stability’ is the primary objective of the European System of 
Central Banks. In relation to the ECB’s primary objective of ‘price stability’, a ‘financial stability’ 
objective is mentioned incidentally in Article 127(5) TFEU as follows: ‘The ESCB shall contribute to the 
smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system’. 
78  This is why Principle 2 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision recommends that 
the functions of the bank supervisor and monetary policymaker be independent from one another. See 
Principle 2 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012). 
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associated with lower average inflation, and to some extent both less inflation 
persistence as well as reduced inflation volatility.79 
The SSM Regulation attempts to address the potential conflict in dual central bank 
mandates by requiring that bank supervision decisions and monetary policy be 
strictly separated by creating a Supervisory Board which would have separate staff 
to work solely on banking supervision matters and not to have links with staff 
involved with monetary policy.80 To reinforce the independence of the Board, ECB 
President Mario Draghi set forth conditions that were added as an amendment to the 
SSM which he argued were necessary to make the plan work and protect the ECB’s 
reputation for maintaining and achieving its monetary policy objective of price 
stability. It is an important policy objective for the ECB, therefore, that supervision 
and monetary policy are ‘rigorously separated’, and the SB governance structure 
allows national supervisors to play a significant role in any supervisory plan for 
participating states. 
Under Article 25 of the SSM Regulation, the Board’s organisational structure and 
operational functions will be separate from the ECB’s monetary policy operations 
and related functions.81 For instance, the SSM tasks are further prohibited from 
interfering with or being determined by the ECB’s other mandates, whether in 
relation to the European Systemic Risk Board or to the solvency monitoring of 
monetary policy counterparties.82 As mentioned above, the separation between 
monetary policy and supervisory tasks within the ECB is reinforced by a requirement 
to ensure the organisational separation of both the staff involved and their reporting 
lines.83 Beyond the separation of the staff involved on both sides of these firewalls, 
the Regulation now requires the ECB to ensure an operational separation for the 
Governing Council itself as regards monetary and supervisory functions, e.g. through 
separated meetings and agendas.84 Moreover, the procedure for appointing the 
Chair and Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board also reflects this separation: rather 
than having the ECB Governing Council elect a member of the Supervisory Board as 
                                                                    
79  ibid. 
80  Germany insisted on separation of the ECB’s supervisory functions from its monetary policy functions 
in order to protect ECB monetary policy from being influenced by the pursuit of banking supervision 
mandates. See Mulbert (2014). 
81  SSM Regulation, Article 25 (‘Separation from monetary policy function’). Article 25 (2) states ‘[t]he ECB 
shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its 
tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks.’ 
82  Article 18(2) first subparagraph of the March compromise. 
83  SSM Regulation, Article 25(2). 
84  Article 18(3a) March compromise. 
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was proposed in the draft Regulation, the Chair and Vice Chair are now appointed by 
the Ecofin and cannot be a member of the ECB Governing Council.85 
Despite the SSM’s focus on independence and separation between the monetary 
policy function and banking supervisory mandate, it is submitted that the broader 
focus of macro-prudential supervision and regulation require some degree of 
coordination between monetary policy and banking supervision. Indeed, much of the 
literature justifying the separation of monetary policy from banking supervision arose 
in a period when monetary policy was seen to be independent from banking 
supervision and that the use of monetary policy instruments to increase bank lending 
in certain sectors of the economy (i.e., small and medium-sized businesses) were 
considered not to be within the central bank’s mandate. However, since the global 
financial crisis of 2007-09, central banks have adopted extraordinary measures of 
monetary policy (i.e., the ECB’s Long-Term Refinancing Operation and the Bank of 
England’s quantitative easing and funding for lending schemes) that necessarily 
involve central banks in assessing the healthiness and viability of bank balance 
sheets in order to have a better understanding of whether the central bank is 
achieving its monetary policy objectives (i.e., price stability). This has particularly 
been the case in the euro area where the European Central Bank has adopted an 
array of monetary policy measures, including its role as the main purchaser of 
asset-backed securities issued by banks and bonds issued by non-bank corporates, 
in order to increase bank lending with an overall view of achieving the ECB’s price 
stability objective of two percent inflation. It is arguable whether the use of such 
broad measures of monetary policy requires the central bank to have more 
information and a view as to the healthiness and ability of individual banks or groups 
of banks to lend in the broader economy. In a financial system where the central 
bank’s use of monetary policy measures has grown to play such an important role in 
affecting bank lending and banking regulation, it calls into question the utility of the 
strict separation between monetary policy and the supervision of individual banking 
institutions. Therefore, the strict separation between the ECB’s monetary policy 
function and its banking supervision mandate in the SSM should be reconsidered. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses how macro-prudential regulation and supervision have 
become the major organizing theme for international regulatory reforms following the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The major lesson to be drawn from 
macro-prudential regulatory reforms is that the focus of regulation will no longer be 
                                                                    
85  Article 26(3). But the SB’s oversight of the SSM is ultimately accountable to the ECB’s Governing 
Council, whose strong form of independence is guaranteed by the Treaty and whose overriding 
mandate is to maintain price stability, which under the Treaty arguably takes precedence over the 
ECB’s banking supervision mandate. However, the Governing Council’s dual oversight of monetary 
policy and banking supervision will be subject to separate agendas that rely on separate groups of staff 
and reporting channels respectively to maintain a semblance of independence for the Council whilst 
making decisions on monetary policy and banking supervision. However the Council’s oversight of 
these dual areas is subject to the “separation” requirement in Article 18(3a), which mandates that 
Council decision-making is based on separate agendas that rely on separate staff and reporting 
channels. 
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on individual banks and financial firms and the protections of their depositors and 
investors but on the structure of the financial system and how off-balance sheet 
activity or ‘shadow banking’ can shift risk around the system while still posing a 
threat to financial stability. Indeed, macro-prudential regulation has necessitated a 
major rethinking of prudential regulation including the urgent need for a major re-
balancing in capital regulation and risk management. An important aspect of this 
rethink is the consensus that is developing over the need for macro-prudential 
regulation and supervision, yet different approaches remain across jurisdictions. 
This chapter argues that effective financial regulation in Europe requires that the 
responsibility for banking supervision be coordinated with monetary policy and that 
supervision is based on a macro-prudential approach that aims to monitor and 
control systemic risks across the financial system. The SSM Regulation, however, 
primarily envisions the ECB engaging in micro-prudential supervision of individual 
‘credit institutions’ and banking groups with limited macro-prudential supervisory 
powers. Further, monetary policy and banking supervision are hindered because of 
the strict separation in the SSM Regulation between banking regulation and 
monetary policy. Finally, enhancing the ECB’s role in macro-prudential supervision 
and regulation should involve formal institutional linkages with the European 
Systemic Risk Board along with legal competence for the ESRB to monitor systemic 
risk in financial markets to coordinate its efforts formally with the ECB in carrying out 
its micro-prudential functions. 
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